LOCKUPS AND DELAWARE VENUE IN CORPORATE LA\V A1�D BANKRUPTCY David A. Skeel, Jr.
• Two of the most hotly contested corporate law issues in recent years have been the use of "lockup" provisions in takeovers and the question whether state competition to attract corporate charters is desirable, because it leads to a "race to the top," or pernicious, because ic induces a "race to the bottom." The debate over lockups, which are provisions granted by a target that promise to compensate a bidder if their proposed sale falls through, 1 dates back to the rise of the takeover market in the mid 1980s. The charter competition debate goes back much further, although the current exchange was launched by vVilliam Cary's 1974 article sharply criticizing Delaware's preeminence in corporate law. 2 Both debates have inspired significant new contributions in the past year and neither shows any signs of subsiding.
Although each of these issues is distinctively corporate in nature, both have provoked similarly heated debate in bankruptcy. In the past decade, increasing use of lockup provisions by corporate debtors and Delaware's new status as a favorite filing location for large corporate debtors have become two of the most controversial issues in bankruptcy practice and theory. The remarkable correlation between the concerns of corporate law and those of corporate bankruptcy is no accident. Rather than being somehow unrelated, corporate bankruptcy is an obvious extension of corporate law, and until the late 1930s, the t\vo were treated as closely connected. Congress severed the connections by enacting sweeping reforms that ushered Wall Street bankers and lawyers out of corporate bankruptcy in 1938.3 The decades that followed can � Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. I am grateful to Lynn LoPucki, Bob Rasmussen, Vice Chancellor Leo Strine and the participants in this symposium for helpful comments on an earliet· drafc.
I. Like other academic commentators, I use the term "lockup" broadly, to include any termination fee, stock option or option to purchase as�ets granted by the target firm to a bidder in connection with a proposed merger or tender offer. Courts and lawyers sometimes distinguish termination (or breakup) fees, on the one hand, from sr.ock and asset options, on the other, and refer to only the Iauer as lockups. 3. Prior to the Chandler Act of 1938, the Wall Street investment bankers who had underwritten a corporate debtor's securities, together with the bankers' attorneys, played a central role in any large scale corporate reorganization. The Chandler Act's new reorganization provision�, which were drafted by future Supreme Court Justice William Douglas and his staff at the Securities and Exchange Commission, dramatically altered the existing regime by mandating that the managers of a corpor.:tte debtor be replaced by an independent trustee. The Chandler Act also prohibited the debtor's current bankers and lawyers fmrn serving as trustee or trustee's counsel. Because of these and other strictures, Wall Street quickly 1244· UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LA JiV REVIEJiV [Vol. 68 be viewed as a slow process of restoring the prior links, and Delaware's sudden emergence as the leading bankruptcy court, together with the prol ife ration of lockups and other takeover devices in bankruptcy, illustrates just how far the process has come. For large fi rms, corporate bankruptcy now looks a great deal like corporate law.
Although the history is i mpor tant, my goal in this Anicle is to c.dvance the normative debate on the two issues I have mentioned lockups and state competition for corporate charters. The first half of the Article weighs in on the role of lockup provisions. Corporate lav .. · commentators have adopted wide ly divergent views of the propriety of lockups, \'vrith sev era l calling for courts to uphold all lockups and others proposing varying levels and kinds of sc rutiny .4 To make sense of this debate, I show that the existing literature can be distilled to three central issues: l) commentators' differing views on the larger corporate law controversy over managers' proper response to unsolicited takeover bids; 2) their views as to whether target managers can or will prove disloyal to shareholders' interests; and 3) their assumptions about the appropriate size oflockups-that is, how much compensation should be allowed. In describing the importance of these three issues, I develop and defend my own normative position. Because lockups can entice managers to accede to a change in control they might otherwise resist, I argue that courts should enforce both first and second bidder lockups. Courts should limit lockup bidders to their reliance interest, however, rather than allowing even larger lockups. 5 Inter estingly, the Delaware case law on lockups has evolved in a direction quite similar to the normative approach I defend. In an important recent case, Bra z en v. Bell Atlantic, 6 the Delaware Supreme
Court analyzed the lockup in question in contractual terms, and outlined a reliance-like framework for scrutinizing future lockups. I argue that Brazen can and should serve as the touchstone for the next iteration of Delaware lockup jurisprudence. See Stephen Fraidin &Jon D. Hanson, Toward Unlocking Lockups, 103 YALE LJ. 1739 , 1743 ( 1994 . Thcir view and the debate as a whole are described in detail in Part !(A), i nfta.
5. I introduced the reliance damages perspective on lockups in David A. Skeel, Jr., A Reliance
Damage.r Approach to Corpom!L Lockups, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 564 (1996) . Although my views have changed on some of the details, as will become clear in Part I, the lockup analysis in this Article should be seen as an extension and refinement of the earlier approach.
6. 695 A.2d 43 (Del. 1997).
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I conclude the lockup analysis by considering the role of lockup provisions in bankruptcy. Although many courts and commentators have contended that bankruptcy calls for an entirely different approach to lockups, I argue that the extensive similarities between the two contexts suggest that courts should also apply a reliance-based approach in bankruptcy-though the approach should be tailored to reflect the nature of the bankruptcy decision making process.
The second half of the Article considers the longstanding state law charter competition debate. The analysis begins by describing the two traditional views: "race to the bottom" theorists insist that Delaware and other states cater to managers at the expense of shareholders, whereas "race to the top" theorists contend that market forces impel managers and states to take shareholder interests into account. 7 Much of the most recent literature leans toward the race to the top view, but concludes that Delaware's dominance enables it to favor local interests such as the Delaware bar. In assessing the literature, I emphasize the moral dimension in the Delaware case law, and show that many of the rules that benefit Delaware lawyers also further Delaware's role as moral arbiter in corporate law.
Turning to corporate bankruptcy, I argue that Delaware's increasingly prominent role in bankruptcy offers many of the same benefits as its preeminence in state corporate law. Because corporate bankruptcy is regulated by Congress rather than the states, the analogy is far from perfect. But the similarities make clear that the recent campaign to prohibit large corporate debtors from filing for bankruptcy in Delaware is misguided. Several recent commentators have challenged an earlier article of mine that defended Delaware's popularity as a bankruptcy forum.8 I conclude by pointing out the problems in their critique.
I. LOCKUPS
As noted above, lockup arrangements take a variety of forms, including termination or breakup fees, stock options, and options to purchase specifi ed assets. Lockups have long been an important feature 7. vVilliam Cary introduced the "race to the bottom" view, as noted above. Cal)', suj;ra note 2, Ralph Winter's response to Cary initiated the "race to the top" literature. Ralph K, \Vinter,J r,, Swte Law, Shareholder Protecliun, and tJze 7/uory of/Jze Corporalwn, 6J LEGAL STUD, 251 (1977) 967,972-73, 993-94,996-97 (1999 The remainder of the part focuses on lockups in the bankruptcy context. As in the initial section, the bankruptcy analysis looks first at the existing literature, then turns to the most recent bankruptcy cases.
A. The Lockup Debate in Co rporate Law Theory
The leading early articles on lockups emerged in connection with the literature on hostile takeovers, and reflected commentators' pervasive concerns about managers' resistance to takeover bids.10 The concern was (and is) quite simple. In the face of an unwanted takeover bid, the managers of the target frequently look for an alte.:: native bidder, a "white knight" who may implicitly commit to protecting the managers' policies and jobs. Although the white knight strategy sometimes inspires a bidding contest and obtains a higher price for the target's shareholders, the target's managers can use a lockup both to chill the 9. Bankruptcy's reorganization provisions arc set forth in Chapter II of the Bankruptcy Code. II U.S.C. § § II 01-1174 II 01- (1994 . Chapter 7 provides the framework for liquidating a corporation. II U.S. C. § § 701-766 (1994 would-be hostile bidders from interferin g with the friendly arrangement .
Thus, target managers can use lockups to fend off both actual and hyp othetical hostile bidders. The most obvious way to prevent managers from using lockups to discourage unwanted bidders would be to prohibit them altogether. But lockup arrangements are not always pernicious. In addition to serving as a defensive mechanism, lockups also can be used for such benign purposes as enticing a bidder to increase its bid.
The initial lockup articles searched for ways to permit beneficial lockups while prohibiting the malignant ones. The most prominent suggestion came from Stephen Bainbridge, who proposed a bright line test: courts should strike down any lockup that was worth more than ten percent of the target firm's value, but uphold any lockup in a lesser amount. 1 2 Two other commentators argued that lockups should be subject to a vote by the target's shareholders.13
The second generation of lockup analysis was inspired by a simple but elegant insight by Ian Ayres. Although courts and commentators previously had assumed that lockups affected only the unfortunate, "locked out" bidder, Ayres showed that lockups have precisely the same effect on the favored, "lockup" bidder. 14 Lockups reduce the amount both bidders are willing to bid, and therefore will not ordinarily affect (1999) . Regan argues that courts should consider four factors when determining whether to enforce a lockup: l) whether the lockup bidder knew or should have known that the target managers breached their fiduciary duty in connection with the proposed agreement; 2) whether the agreement lud already been performed or was wholly executory; 3) whether any fairness concerns implicated by target managers' breach are based on strong policy commitments; 4) whether reliance damages are available in the event the lockup bidder is an innocent party. A.. lthough his exploration of contract and trust bw provides doctrinal support for a reliance-based approach, Regan's analysis differs from my reliance theory in its greater willingness to invalidate lockups altogether-that is, to deny a lockup bidder even its reliance interest. Regan's analysis also has several limitations as a source of doctrinal guidance. First, the fiduciary duty inquiry in the first and third factors is somewhat circular: it may not be clear whether the target board has breached its fiduciary duty or not, or how strong the fairness concern is, until the Delaware Chancery Court has assessed the board's performance. This, of course, is precisely the assessment that the four factors are intended to in Corm. Second, most of the contract and trust doctrines Regan identifies, such as courts' unwillingness to enforce contracts made with an underage or incompetent promisor, arc narrow exceptions to a gennal policy of enforcement. The general enforceability of lockups, b)· contrast, is much more in q uestion. What are we to make of this burgeoning literature on lockups (not to mention the equally vibrant case law, which we will explore in a moment)? As diverse and at times complex as the literature is, the debate can be distilled to three crucial issues: 1) whether courts should focus on maximizing value from an ex ante or an ex post p erspective by promotin g passivity or auctions, respectively; 2) ·whether target managers can or will use locku p s for disloyal purposes; and 3) what the appropriate measure of lockup " damages " should be. The first two issues implicate the longstanding debate about takeover defenses and the proper role of target managers, and the third focuses more n arrowly on lockups. By exploring each of these issues, we can arbitrate among the existing approaches and develop a more compelling explanation of the role of lockups in corporate law. The first question, whether courts should focus on maximizing value ex ante or ex post, was inspired by Easterbrook and Fischel's so-called "passivity thesis" concerning target manager's appropriate response to unsolicited takeover bids. 30 Prior commentators had tended to assume that auctioning a target corporation to the highest bidder was the best outcome for the shareholders of target firms, since it would lead to higher bids. Easterbrook and Fischel challenged this reasoning. They pointed out that by forcing the initial bidder to pay more for the target corporation or even lose the bidding altogether, auctions reduce a bidder's expected profits. Potential bidders will therefore engage in less search in an auction regime than they would in a world that promised a greater return on their investment. Once a bid has been made-ex post-shareholders do better if the target's managers conduct an auction; but from an ex ante perspective, shareholders should prefer a regime that offers higher returns to initial bidders, since a bidder friendly regime leads to more takeover activity (as well as a greater deterrent effect on managers). On balance, Easterbrook and Fischel argue, shareholders benefit more from a world with more takeovers at somewhat lower prices, than they would with fewer takeovers at higher pnces. Bebchuk and Gilson contended that auctions maximize both shareholder and social value, much as Easterbrook and Fischel viewed p assivit y as superio r o n bot h co u nts.
33. In his contribution to the debate, Ahn Schwan:,: emphasized that a bidder's profits (and thus the incentive to sea rch) will always be higher if it acquires the firm, since this enables the bidder to prolit fro m at least 50% of the fi rm's shares, rather than from a smaller, minority stake. Schwartz, J1Jpra note 30, at 237. 
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LOCKUPS AND DE'LA f!VARE VENUE 1253 lockup may under some circumstances reduce the likelihood that a second bidder will emerge and bid up the price that must be paid fo r the target. 34 Second bidder lockups, on the other hand, bring an additional bidder into the picture and should therefore be prohibited. In contrast to Easterbrook and Fischel, auction enthusiasts should be more sympathetic to second bidder lockups, since they fa vor a regime that encourages active bidding. first bidder lockups arc problematic fr om this perspective if they discourage addi tional bidding, but desirable if they induce an initial bid.
Can Target .tv!anagers Use Lockups Disloyally?
In addition to the distinction between passivity and auctions, a second crucial issue is whether target managers can use lockups disloyally. As we add disloyalty to the picture, the analysis will both describe the existing literature and begin more explicitly to develop my own normative view.
Simply put, there are two camps on the disloyalty issue, those who conclude that managers cannot use lockups to further their own purposes, and those who view disloyalty as a serious concern. Fraidin and Hanson insist that target managers cannot use lockups disloyally.
Not only do many managers have a significant stock interest, which encourages them to act in shareholders' interests, but they cannot successfully serve their own interests at the expense of target shareholders as a group because a bidder that protected disloyal managers would lose out to bidders who sought to run the firm in a more efficient manner. Like Easterbrook and Fischel, they contend that Coasian bargaining will assure that the highest valuing bidder u l timately acquires the targe t, even if a lower valuing bidder prevails in the first instance. But, as noted in the text, they defend second bidder lockups, which often lead to auctions; and much of their amlvsis seems to assu me that shareholders have an interest in maximizing value ex post. For a discussion and critique ofF raid in and Hanson's su pp ort fo r second bidder lockups, see Kahan & Klausner, supra note 25, at 155 1-52 n. 37. The obvious problem with each of these views is that the ciaim that man agers always act loyally is implausible. In some (and perhaps many)
cases, target managers may grant a lockup that is large enough to enable a lower valuing bidder to acquire the target.38 Al ternatively, target managers sometimes can tilt the playing fi eld enough--through differential access to information, fo r instance-to allow a lower valuing bidder to win.39 At least as important, and of particular interest fo r present purposes, is managerial disloyalty that brings a higher valuing bidder into the contest.40
Consider a simple illustration. Hostile values Target at $67 5,000, and makes a hostile bid of $600,000. Rather than accede to the bid, Target's managers look fo r and find an alternative bidder, Friendly, who values Target at $700,000. In return fo r an implicit promise that Friendly will treat the managers well (by, fo r instance, preserving their jobs or offering an attractive severance package), Target's managers grant Friendly a $20,000 lockup when Friendly bids. Although the lockup does not change the bidders' relative valuations, it does reduce the amount that Friendly must pay to acquire Target. VVithout the lockup, Friendly would win the bidding by offering (sligh tly more than) 3 7. Prohibiting second bidder lockups can thus be see n as responding to a collective action problem.
Lo yal managers, on this view, would prefer that ali firms com mit ex ante to fo rego second bidder lockups in order to maximize the benefits of t.1. keovcrs. Once a target firm receives a bid , however, loyal target managt:rs have an incentive to defect, and to generate competing bids so that they can obtain a higher price ex post. Pmhibiting second bidder lock u ps would make defection somewhat more difii cult.
38. This is the fo reclosing locku p identif1ed by Ayrcs-a locku p that exceeds the lockup bidder's expectation interest and which, as a result, may fe nd off even higher valuing bidders. Ay1·es, sup ra note 14, at 699-700. See also Coates & Subramanian, .111pm note 18 (arguing that lockups may often have a fo reclosing effe ct).
39. For a discussion of reasons that even "loya l" target managers may grant excessin: lockups, see Skeel, supra note 5, at 57 5-80 (considering mistake and bargaining power diffe rences). between Warner La mbert and American Home Products were well u nderway, but the parties had not reached a final agreement, when Pfizer announced an intention to make a bid fo r \Va rner L> mbert.
Ft·aidin and Hanson would not treat
Shortly t hereafter, \Va rner Limbert and American Home Products signed a p re l i m ina ry merger agreement tha t included aS 1.8 billion termination fe e. See, e.g. , A . forr P&G, vVhat's Next in P)i ::.. er War, WAU. ST.j.,Jan. 27, 2000, at C I. U nd e r the three-fold typology, thi s termination fc c would presumably q u a l i fy as anticipatory, give n Pfizer's intent to bid. If Pfizer had been less explicit about its i n temion s, hown·e r, or
Pfizn
were not yet p re pared to make a serious bid, the distinction between an tici patory and nonanticipatory would be quite murky. Notice, too, that a potential bidder would have a strategic incentive;
to announce an i n tt:rest in order to destabilize the target's intended agreement with anmhcr bidder.
46. R,uher than calling fo r blanket prohibition, Kahan and Klausnct· p rov ide a multifactor test fo r determining whether these lockups should be struck down. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 25, at 1564-68. But they seem to envision that nearly all will be invalidated. 
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LOCKUPS AND DELA WA RE VEJ .fUE 1257 a beneficial fu nction. In effect, lockups may "b ribe " target managers to agree to a change in control they vvould otherwi se resist. +B If target managers truly had the power to "j ust say no" under current law, the argument fo r permitting (at least some) disloyal locku p s to entice target managers to relinquish control would be especially strong.+'�
The reality is more complex, however. r-'\l though Largc t managers can resist ne arly any bid so long as they remain in power, hostile bidders can wage a proxy fi gh t in an effort to replace the incumbent directors. Aft er a successful proxy fi gh t, the hostile bidder can effect a takeover. Added to the threat of a proxy fight is the possibility that institutional shareholders may pressure the targe t's managers to agree to a takeover.
The question, then, is whether the possibility of a proxy fight fr ees up the market fo r control enough to make anticipatory and second bidder lockups unnecessary. In my view, it does not. The proxy contest alternative is an expensive and time-consuming mechanism fo r obtaining control. Moreover, if the target firm has a staggered board whose members can only be removed fo r cause, it may be impossible to replace a majority of the board's directors in a single proxy fight. The prospect of target resistance and the limitations of a hostile bidder's alternatives suggests that even potentially disloyal lockups may play a desirable role.50
If we shift fr om Kahan and Klausner--who draw most directly fr om the ex ante , passivity perspective-to the views of an auction enthusiast who concedes the possibility of managerial disloyalty, the case fo r permitting both anticipatory and second bidder lockups (at least in some cases) becomes still stronger. vVe have already seen the most important benefit of "disloyal" lockups: they require target managers to agree to a change of control transaction.
Interestingly, and of particular importance fo r auction enthusiasts, the lockup strategy gives the only sure path to success is to fi nd a higher valuing, fr iendly bidder.
In the earlier illustration, fo r instance, Friendly won the biddinp · . 0
because it placed a higher val ue on Target (13 7 00,000) than Hostile did (:5675,000).''' _-\ s noted earlier, T arge t' s managers and Friendly both b enefit so lon g as the managerial protections are worth up to S20,000
and Target's shareholders benefit fr om the highe r takeover pre mium .
In short, fo r an auction enthusiast, concerns about managers disloyalty are counterbalanced by the fa cts that lockups encourage Target's managers both to relinquish the firm's independence and to fi nd a higher valuing bidder.
To summarize, the possibility of managerial disloyalty complicates the lockup analysis in intriguing respects. From an ex ante, passivity perspective, both anticipatory and second bidder lockups are probl ematic, since they may introduce an additional bidder an d thus undermine an initial bidder's returns fr om search. Yet, because they fo rce target managers to relinquish their independence, lockups also offer countervailing benefits. The question fo r proponents of passivity, then, is whether l ockups' value as an enticement to target managers o utweighs the chilling effect they have on bidder search.
For auction enthusiasts, the benefits of lockups are both straightforward and compelling. To the extent lockups promote bidding and encourage target managers to sleuth out the highest valuing bidder, they help to achieve the principal benefits of an auction regime.
Lockups should thus be especially attractive to auction theorists, at least to the extent they are appropriately constrained.
In a moment, we will consider how lockup compensation, the last of the three factors, can be used to provide app ropriate constraints. But fi rst v;e should brief1y address the most recent academic perspective on the lockup issue.
As our discussion of target manager disloyalty suggests, much of the existing commentary has fo cused on agency costs and other distorti ons fa cing target firms. Once vve take the possibility of disloyal ty into account, however, permitting unlimited first bidder lockups proves more problematic. Because anticipatory first bidder lockups undermine bidder re turns and the market fo r corporate control, they should be prohibited if possible.
The distinction bet\v een anticipatory and nonanticipatory first bidder lockups migh t suggest that all nonancipatory first bidder lockups should be enforced, no matter how large. 5° But, as we have seen, it may often be difficult to disti nguish beween anticipatory and nonanticipatory first bidder lockups, which suggests that courts should be hesitant about approving large lockups. 59. An au ctio n theorist who believes that target m;ungers cannot or will not act disloyally would uphold bo th lirst and second bidder lockups, since both can be used to stimulate bidding. Fraidin and The analysis thus makes clear that courts should enfo rce both first and second bidder lockups. Yet the relian ce approach also leaves flexibility fo r courts to adjust their scrutiny in light of the nature of the lockup in question. Perhaps most importantly, courts should construe reliance especially strictly with second bidder lockups.67 The costs of bidding are often lower for a second bidder (in part, because they can fr ee ride on the search efforts of the initi al bidder), and the lost opportunity costs for second bidders are likely to be lower. 68 C ourts should take each of these considerations into account in determining the lockup bidder's reliance interest. The same reasoning suggests that courts should construe reliance more restrictively with a lockup that is clearly anticipatory, since such bids may free ride on an expected bid.
Courts should not deny compensation altogether, however. Because anticipatory lockups may entice target managers to relinquish control, they too should be enforced up to the amount of the bidder's reliance interest. Courts also should distinguish among the different kinds of lockups. Interestingly, despite the judicial hostility to stock lockups, stock lockups arguably should b e encouraged because they give th e 65. From the per spective of De laware law, the auction persp ective is the mot·c re levant approach, since it accords mor e closely with the Delaware court5' cmph «sis on maximizing va lue fo r shareholders in a takeover auction. 67. Su Skeel, sup ra note 5, at 600-0 l.
68. Second bidders also may not have as great a reputational stake as the first bidder. A fi rst bidder that entas intO a proposed merger with the target but then loses a bidding contest to a subsequent bidder may, as a re sult, become ,·iewed a takeove r ta rgu itself. In most of the pre-Brazen cases, Delaware courts have tended to treat lockups as part of the larger question of whether target managers fu lfilled their fiduciary duties. In several cases where target managers entered into merger agreements v"� th one bidder and no competing bidder emerged, or where the lockup came at the end of an auction, the courts scrutinized both the overall transaction and the lockup arrangement under the business jud g ment rule. In th ese cases, Delaware upheld even large lockups-lockups that affected as much as 20% of the target's stock. 71 Delaware courts take a much closer look both at target managers' overall periormance and at the lockup, however, when an additional bidder emerges either before or after the managers grant a lockup to a favored bidder. The seminal cases are In Revlon, Revlon granted a lockup to Forstmann, Little in the midst of a bidding contest between Forstmann, the "white knight," and Pantry Pride, an umvanted hostile bidder. In addition to articulating its fa mous Revlon duties, which require managers to obtain the best reasonably obtainable value for shareholders once a sale of the target becomes inevitable, the Delaware Supreme Court also applied searching scrutiny Paramount. Because the option could prove unreasonably generous, the supreme court concluded that it too must be struck down. H
The cases discussed thus fa r can be described as taking a pure fiduciary duty approach to lockup arrangements. Focusing solely on fiduciary duty has several related limitations. One limitation is that the lockup and fi duciary duty inquiries blur together if courts apply the same analysis in both contexts. Courts tend to strike down a lockup if they disapprove of the managers' overall performance, and uphold lockups when the managers have satisfied their fiduciary duties. Yet lockups can perform a valuable fu nction (recall that they serve as an implicit "bribe") even if the directors have othenvise breached their duties. A more distinct lockup standard would help to distinguish the lockup and overall duty inquiries. A second, quite similar issue is that the fiduciary duty analysis can obscure the crucial issue of lockup compensation-whether the lockup is properly calibrated or excessive.
In Brazen, its most recent lockup case, the Delaware Supreme Court appears to address precisely these concerns. Brazen arose as a class action filed by shareholders ofBell Atlantic asking the Delaware courts to invalidate a $550 million termination fe e Bell Atlantic granted to NYNEX in connection with their proposed merger. In upholding the termination fe e, Chiefjustice Veasey explicitly eschewed the fiduciary duty approach in fav or of a contractual analysis. Because the merger agreement characterized the termination fe e as liquidated damages, he held that a liquidated damages analysis should apply. Under Del aware law, such a provision is enforceable if "the damages are uncertain and the amount agreed upon is reasonable."75 Applying this standard, the 74. Sa id. at jQ-j l. The court questioned the terms of the lockup and emphasized tint the stock option "had the potential to reach (and in this case did reach) unreasonable le"els. 78. Given that Bra:un involved a mer·ger of eq uals, it is also possible that Delaware will limit i ts app l icatio n to this context. The analysis of this Article suggests that the approach should also be applied in cases that implica te target managers' Rev/on or Un oca/ duties. The final issue to watch fo r is whether the Delaware courts will ad just their interpretation of appropriate lockup damages as they apply it to different bidding contests-most importantly, whether Delav.rare construes the lockup bidders' costs more narrowly in the second bidder context than with first bidders. Once again, Brazen's fo cus on reliance based costs lends itself easily to just these kinds of distincti ons.
C. Lockups in Bankruptcy
As in corporate law, breakup fe es and other lockup arrangements play a prominent role in many corporate bankruptcy cases. The question that courts and commentators have asked, and rightly so, is whether lockups offer the same benefits in bankruptcy as they do in corporate law. To answer this question and to determine how bankruptcy lockups should be treated, let us briefly consider the three fa ctors we used to explore lockups in the corporate context.
On the first fa ctor, the choice between passivity and auctions, the consensus view seems to be that courts should adopt an auction I do not mean to suggest that bankruptcy simply mirrors corporate law in all relevant respects . It obvi ously does not. In an influential article, Bruce Markell explores several of the most significant differences between bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy sales.86 In Markell's view, these distinctions, together with managers' ability (which they also have outside of bankruptcy) to reduce bidders' due diligence costs by giving them additional information, diminish the need to use lockups to induce bids.87 None of these considerations is a substitute fo r lockups, however.
Although bankruptcy may reduce bidders' costs and uncertainty to some these transactions from an ex post wealth maxim iza tion perspective. Roosevelt, supra note 29, at 'H. The o ther important bankruptc;· lockup articles, each of which adopts an auction perspective, arc :Vf ark F. 85. The Bankruptcy Code pcrmiLs the debtor's managers to continue ru nning the business in bankruptcy, see, e.g. , Bankruptcy Code § 1 107 (establishing powers of "dcbwr in possessio n "), and the so called "exclusivity period" assures that the debtor's managers arc the on ly ones who can propose a reorganiza tion pbn fo r at least the first 120 days of the case. Bankruptcy Code § 1 121. by contacting over 300 pote n tial bidders, winnowing the list to five, and then signing an agreement vvith Calpine that included $4 million in bre akup fe es. The bankruptcy court postponed its decision whether to approve the lockup, then refused to enforce it after another bidder outbid Calpine. In upholding the bankruptcy court decision, the Third Circuit took a troublingly hostile stance toward bankruptcy lockups.91
The O)Brien opinion emphasizes, fo r instance, that Calpine continued to bid, even though it knew that its breakup fe e might be denied.92 Yet Calpine's continued bidding was entirely rational----m ore so, rather than less so if the validity of its lockup was in doubt93-and tells us nothing about the question whether its lockup was desirable or pernicious.
What might a better approach look like? Given the benefits of lockups, courts should use the same reliance-based fr amework I defended earlier as their starting point, with appropriate modifications fo r bankruptcy. Perhaps the most important bankruptcy-specific fa ctor is the nature of the bankruptcy court process with respect to the 88. A final poi nt reinforces this conclusion: Markell's skeptical account ofbankruptcy lockups seems to focus on managers who have already decided to seek a sale and bidders who are com miued to maki ng a bid. As we saw in the corporate context, lockups may entice managers to agree to a sale in the first instance, and they can be used to induce a bid from a bidder who might otherwise hesitate. For a similar point, see Hebbeln, supra note 84, at 497 (c riticizing existing analysis because "it places too much emphasis on the role of break-up fe es in encouraging (or discouraging) fu rther bids ... and too little emphasis on the role break-up fe es play in encouraging the initial bid"). 93 . Even if the lockup were enforceable, Calpine would ha\"C an incentive to keep bidding so long as its expected profits exceeded the value of " the lockup. H validity of the lockup \vere in doubt, Calpine would discount its value and continue bidding so long as its expected profits exceeded the reduced ,·alue of the lockup.
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LOCKUPS AND DELA �VARE VENUE 1269 transaction in question. Sales of assets that do not involve the entire firm can be approved at a so-called section 363 hearing,94 whereas transactions that affect the reorganization as a whole must be put to a vote of all classes of creditors and shareholders.95 Because the section 363 approach entails substantially less delay than the firm-wide reor g anization vote, courts should be more restrictive in the reliance costs they allow in that conccxt. Courts also should be somewhat stingier about reliance costs in cases like 0-'Bnen, where the debtor initiated the auction and provided extensive information to the bidders.
It is worth emphasizing that even if the bidder's reliance interest is re l atively limited, this does not mean that the lockup in questi on should be prohibited. As in corporate law, the best approach is to limit, but ge nerally permit, lockup arrangements (and to permit them fo r both first and second bidders). 130. In response to my suggestion that cou rts might develop diiTcrcnt approaches to issues such as postpetition financing and extensions of a debtor's exclusivit y period, Eisenberg and LoPueki assert that the "Dclawan: bankruptcy court would be req uired to fo llow fe deral law on these matters." Id. at 972 n. l8. Concerning postpctition credit, ! I U.S. C. § 364 states the bankruptcy court "may" approve credit in various contexts, and 11 U.S.C. § 1 121 (d) gives the bankruptcy court discretion "for cause [tO J reduce or increase" the exclusivity period. By their own terms, these provisions obviously give courts a great deal of discretion in determining what it means to "follow fe deral law on these matters."
131. See, e.g., Skeel, supra note 8, at 29-3 1 (speculating about fu ture Delaware treatment of these issues). The fa ct that Delaware remains firms' venue of choice is a tribute to the Delaware corporate culture, rather than simply a single judge . Nor is this confidence misplaced. Delaware's current bankruptcy judges have maintained the same reputation fo r speed and administrative efficiency asjudge Balick.
The current venue system is fa r fr om ideal . A better approach would limit fi rm's venue options fr om the outset, rather than giving them a !35. Thus, when Eisenberg & LoPucki suggest that my "underlying premise-that fa st is eflicient··· wo uld suggest that New York's case processi ng was incflicicnt d u ri n g the pe riod when New York was the ve nue of choice," id. a t 996-97, I would agree that New York might have been inefficient ra ther than conc l ud i n g, as they do, that neiih.er New York or Delaware tends toward cf1icicncy.
!36. Sr.e it!. at 972-73 ("(T]hc pri ncipal purpose of fo rum shopping is w o b ta i n or a,·oid the assignment of panicuiar judges."); id. at 997 (suggesting that Delaware replaced New York as fo rum of choice because " [o] ne no longer could be so confident in the chances of assignment tojudge Lif1and in New
York, but one could be sure of assignment to judge Ba!ick in Delaware").
13 7. Although Eisenberg & LoPucki's study suggests that the rate of venue shopping decreased in 1997, they point out that it "remains at historically high levels" and that "Delaware currentl y dominates fo rum shopping to a degree that New York neve r has." /d. at 978-79.
LOCKUPS AND DEIA JIVA. RE VE NUE 1279 choice at the time ofbankruptcy, as both I and Rasmussen and Thomas have proposed. But so long as the current approach remains, it is crucial that lawmakers i nclude corporate domicile as a venue option.
III. CONCLUSION
Th:s Article has fo cused on severai of the most pressing issues in corporate law and bankruptcy, issues that have both theoretical and practical significance. \V ith lockups, I have argued that co u r ts should enforce both first and second bidder lockups, but should limit lockup bidders to their reliance interest. This approach enables target managers to use lockups to induce bids and encourages them to accede to a change in control, bu t limits the lockup's chilling effect on other bidders. I have argued that courts should also apply a reliance-based approach in bankruptcy, rather than casting a cold eye on lockups as recent bankruptcy cases have done. In an ideal world, corporate law and corporate bankruptcy would be connected. Although the two areas remain separate, our discussion of lockups and charter competition illustrates just how much the distance between them has closed in recent years.
